Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Safeguards
On August 11, 1995, when President Clinton announced U.S. support for a "zero
yield" Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the President established
concrete, specific safeguards that define the conditions under which the United
States can enter into a CTBT. These safeguards will strengthen our commitments
in the areas of intelligence, monitoring and verification, stockpile stewardship,
maintenance of our nuclear laboratories, and test readiness. They also specify
the circumstances under which the President would be prepared, in consultation
with Congress, to exercise our supreme national interest rights under a CTBT
to conduct necessary testing if the safety or reliability of our nuclear deterrent
could no longer be certified. The President also directed the establishment
of a new annual reporting and certification requirement that will ensure that
our nuclear weapons remain safe and reliable under a CTBT. The safeguards that
were established are as follows:
- A: The conduct of a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program to ensure a
high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in
the active stockpile, including the conduct of a broad range of effective and
continuing experimental programs.
- B: The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in
theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology which will attract, retain, and
ensure the continued application of our human scientific resources to those
programs on which continued progress in nuclear technology depends.
- C: The maintenance of the basic capability to resume nuclear test activities
prohibited by the CTBT should the United States cease to be bound to adhere
to this treaty.
- D: Continuation of a comprehensive research and development program to improve
our treaty monitoring capabilities and operations.
- E: The continuing development of a broad range of intelligence gathering and
analytical capabilities and operations to ensure accurate and comprehensive
information on worldwide nuclear arsenals, nuclear weapons development programs,
and related nuclear programs.
- F: The understanding that if the President of the United States is informed
by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy (DOE) -- advised by
the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories
and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command -- that a high level of confidence
in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type which the two Secretaries
consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified,
the President, in consultation with Congress, would be prepared to withdraw
from the CTBT under the standard "supreme national interests" clause
in order to conduct whatever testing might be required.
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